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VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Richmond, Virginia
June 27-28, 1961

SECTION ONE

QUESTIONS
1.
Corpus Blackstone, an attorney, was Judge of the
Court of McDill County, Virginia. Reckless Jones was tried
before Judge Blackstone on a warrant charging him with assault and
pattery of his wife, Angel Jones. Judge Blackstone acquitted
eckless Jones of the charge.
Shortly thereafter, Angel Jones brought a suit for
vorce from bed and board against Reckless Jones on the ground of
ruelty, through her attorney, Will Brown. When Reckless Jones
ound out that he had been sued for divorce by his wife, he thereon went to Corpus Blackstone and asked Judge Blackstone to
fend his interests in the divorce suit.
Should Judge Blackstone accept employment to defend the
nterests of Reckless Jones in the divorce suit?
2.
Bert Nuckols is a travelling salesman for a large
rporation and has resided in the City of Roanoke for the past
veral years. In July of 1958, while on one of his mid-western
urs, Nuckols was in Omaha, Ne brasl<:a, with nothing to do over the
ek-end. He telephoned his friend Harry Handsome and invited
dsome to drive with him as his guest on a social visit to
coln, Nebraska. The invitation was accepted. While Nuckols was
iving on the trip, an automobile without warning suddenly pulled
t of a side road, collided with the automobile of Nuckols and
sed injury to Handsome. After making certain that Handsome was
ceiving proper medical care, Nuckols returned to Roanoke.
To
e great surprise of Nuckols, on June 19, 1961, he was sued in the
cuit Court of the City of Roanoke by Handsome who sought $20,000
damages as a result of the accident. Nuckols now seeks your
ice.

Assuming that the law of Nebraska makes the operator of
motor vehicle an insurer of the safety of his guest passengers,
that such law further provides that an action for personal
Jury may be brought.at any time within three years after the
se of action accrues, what defenses, if any, are available to
kols?

3.
Sneaky was indicted in the Circuit Court of Isle of
ht County for burglary of a dwelling house in that county. At
trial, the Commonwealth proved that on the night of the alleged
lary the owner had returned to his home and as he opened his
t door, a man whom he could not identify rushed past him
disappeared into the night. The owner testified further
t he found a leather bag in the house, containing burglar 1.s
ls. The leather bag and its contents were introduced into the
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evidence.
The Commonwealth calJ.ed as its witness Mrs. Sneaky and
offered to prove by her: that, although they were now divorced,
at the time of the burglary she and Sneaky were husband and wife
and that they re sided in the town of FraY-1lclin; that neither of
them ever had any reason to go near the vicinity of the burglarized
home, but that Sneaky had requested her several times prior to the
burglary to drive him to the home, which she had done; that on the
day before the burglary she had seen Sneaky place in the truck of
his automobile a leather bag containing burglar's tools; and that
such bag ~nd tools were the same a.s those introduced into the
evidence.
Sneaky objected to the introduction of the testimony by
his former wife.
How should the Court rule on Sneaky's objection?

4.
In May, 1960, Cas~er Lamb agreed in writing to
purchase a house and lot from Benevolent Land Company for a purchase price of $10,000, paying $500 at the time of signing the
contract, assuming an existing first-mortgage loan of $8,500, and
agreeing to pay the balance of $1,000 in twenty monthly installments. Under the contra.ct, a deed was to be delivered to Lamb
when he completed the installment payments. Shortly after entering
into the contract, Lamb obtained from a local bank a Federal Property Improvement loan for $1,200. This loan was not secured by lien
on the property, but by Federal regulation Lamb was required to
devote the proceeds to home improvements, and the loan was so used.
Before Lamb had completed the monthly payments, he and
Harry Wolf signed the followingw~..iting at the bottom of the original
written contract:
February 27, 1961. For value received, Casper Lamb hereby
assigns the above contract to Harry Wolf.
11

"It is agreed that the balance owing on the Benevolent Land,
Company property will be paid off and Mr. Lamb will not be
responsible for further payments on the loan."
At the time these papers were signed on February 27, 1961, Wolf
Paid Lamb $900 cash, for which he received a written receipt. When
Wolf took possession of the property, he refused to pay the $1,200
F.P.I. loan, claiming that it was not his obligation. After Lamb
was compelled to make the payments, he brought an action against
Wolf to recover the $1,200.
At the trial, Lamb introduced the foregoing writings in
evidence and offered to testify that at the time he sold his
interest in the property to Wolf, it was understood and agreed that
Wolf would pay off the F.P.I. loan of $1,200. Wolf objected to the
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papers.
How should the Court rule on Wolf's objection?

5.
East was proceeding easterly and West was proceeding
westerly in their respective automobiles on Main Street in the town
of Gloucester, which street is two lanes wide and divided in its
center by double white lines. As the two cars came abreast of
each otherJ a collision occurr,~d between them, as a result of which
East was injured. East ins ti tu':;ed an action for damages against
West in the Circuit Court of Gloucester County.
At the trial East called as a witness Overstreet, who
testified that while on business in Gloucester he had come upon the
scene of the accident several minutes after it occurred and that
he found the debris from tee collision entirely in the east-bound
lane of the street, about three feet from the double white lines.
He further testified that the only dams.ge to East's car was on its
left rear fender, and tliat che West car- was damaged only on its
left front fender.
Overstreet further testified that he had been in the emthe Virginia Automobile Association for 19 years, and that
for the entire time his duty had been to analyze the causes of
automobile accidents, and that his present position was that of
Head Safety Engineer of the Association. His qualifications as an
expert were admitted by counsel for both East and West.
Overstreet then offered, over West's objection, to testify
that in his expert opinion the accident had occurred as a result of
est's swerving suddenly to his left as the automobiles came
breast of each other, that Wc;st had traveled approximately three
eet into the east-bound lane and struclt the East automobile on
ts left rear fender.
Should the Court admit this testimony by Overstreet?

6.
Passcngc;r was injured when a taxicab owned and
erated by Cabbie and in which Passenger was being transported,
llided with an automobile owned and operated by Brown at a street
tersection in Radford, Virginia. Passenger instituted an action
motion for judgment against Cabbie, seeking damages for his
juries. Upon service of process, Cabbie immediately moved the
urt to enter its order requiring Passenger to amend his motion
r judgment to bring Brown in as a defendant, on the ground that
re was a non-joinder of parties. In support of his motion
bie filed an affidavit stating that B1. . own was subject to the
isdiction of the Court and that Brown was guilty of negligence
ch proximately contributc;d to the accident.
How should the Court rule on Gabbie's motion?
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7.
Carpenter, a building contractor, instituted an
action by motion for judgment against Hanson, alleging that
carpenter had contracted to construct a hoffie for Hanson, that the
construction had be·en completed. in accordance with the contract,
but that Hanson had refused to pay for the same. Upon being served
with process in this action" Ea1~son immediately filed his counterclaim against Carpenter jn wh:._ch Hanson alleged that the construction had been perforrr.8d ln s'J.cb.. an unwor~·G!lo.nJ.ike manner that Hanson
was compelled to ex:;_.;--.:;nd 12.r-,g-2 FJUrns of rnoJ.'ley 1n order to make the
house ha bi table, for wh:!_c.h h.e sough,c j~1drynent against carpenter.
On the morning of' t::-ic:; tr·:i.:'!.l) b0:f.'ore the jury was impaneled,
carpenter moved the Court for a cc:nc:tn'-lan·Je of the action on the
ground that sever2l wit::.1esses on whom he relied, but who were not
subpoenaed, were una.b1e to be p:·:>esent. The Court overruled the
motion. The trial pro::::eederJ, .s·.::1d a.t'ter b8".:;h parties had rested and
the jury had been 5.:ristr1.lctsd. and the attorneys had concluded their
s to the j'J.::.."':v. Ga:'.":~:er.ter's attorney sensed from the expresof the jurors that his case had fared poorly because of
r's lack of expert witnesses; and as the jury was preparing
to retire to consider· its verd.lct, ca PpeJ.1ter' s a. ttorney moved the
Court to be permitted to suffer a non-suit, which motion Hanson's
~ttorney opposed.
How should the Court rule on Carpenter's motion for a non-

8.
Pearson.:1 a resident of Pennsylvania., visited Richmond
or the purpose of attending a sales conference and, while crossing
race Street, he was strucl-{ and injured by an automobile driven by
nton, a resident of Delaware .. Pearson immediately engaged a
chmond attorney, who instituted an actJon agair.st Benton in the
ited States Dist:i."'ict Court for the Eastern :Jistrict of Virginia,
chrnond Division, seeking damages in the amount of $25,000. Pross was served on Benton just as he was checking out of the Hotel
chmond. When Benton failed to file any responsive pleadings,
,
e action proceeded to trial which resulted in a $10,000 judgment
default being entered against him.
Pearson then sued Benton on the default judgment in the
ited States District Court for Dela-ware, in which diatrict
nton resides. Benton filed his responsive pleadings in which he
ntended (1) that the judgment against him in Virgin:L.a was void
cause the Federal District Court in Virginia lacked jurisdiction,
) ths.t the judgment against him was void because the District
u:::·t in Virginia had no venue of the action, and (3) that Pearson
s guilty of contributory negligence.
How should the District Court of Delaware rule on each of
ese defenses in acting on Pearson's motion to strike them out?

-
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9.
The Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia,
entered a final judgment in an action at law against Shepard on
the 1st day of February, 1961. Shepard promptly directed his
attorney to take the necessary steps to perfect an appeal. Whereupon counsel for Shepard, within the time prescribed by law, obtained a certification of the testimony and other incidents of the
trial by the trial judge and filed his notice of appeal and assignments of error. On the 15th day of May, 1961, counsel for Shepard
filed with the clerk of the circuit court a designation of the
parts of the record that he wished printed and, pursuant to direction of Shepard's counsel, the clerk transmitted the record to one
of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals on the 29th day of
May, 1961, A writ of error was granted upon a Petition presented
to the same Justice of the Court on the 30th day of May, 1961,
At the time the case came on for argument, counsel for defendant
in error moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the writ
of error had been improvidently awarded.
How should the Court rule?
10. Marble filed a suit in equity in the Circuit Court
of Lee County, Virginia, against Granite, seeking specific performance of a written contract for the sale of a tract of land known
"Tombstone." Granite filed an answer in which he did not admit
the existence of the written contract, called for proof thereof,
denied that plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought. The
answer did not set out the reasons for which relief should be
d. The trial court heard evidence ore tenus at which time
proved the written contract. The court permitted the
to prove, over the objection of counsel for the plaintiff,
he had not seen the property before the contract was signed;
that before the contract was signed he had been advised by his
riend, Slab, that the property was improved by a newly constructed
~rick residence, and that the property fronted on a hard-surfaced
state highway; that after the contract had been signed he examined
he property and found that his friend had been mistaken about the
roperty he was seeking to purchase, and that the property described
n the contract was not improved by a modern brick dwelling nor did
t front on a hard-surfaced state highway and, because the property
e was purchasing was not as represented by his friend, that it had
value of at least $20,000 less than the agreed purchase price,
e record consisted of the pleadings, the written contract which
d been filed as an exhibit, and the decree of the court. After
aring argument of counsel the court entered a decree containing
e following language:
11

This cause came on to be heard upon the appearance of the
parties; in person and by counsel, upon evidence heard ore
tenus, and upon due consideration whereof the court dot~
adjudge, order and decree that plaintiff is not entitled to
specific performance of the written contract filed as an exhibit with the bill of complaint in this cause. And this suit
is dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff, and the clerk is
directed to place it among causes ended.''

,-

-

0

-

Three months after the date of the entry of said decree
Marble consulted his lawyer and advised that he desired that some
action be taken in an attempt to obtain the relief sought in his
bill of complaint. Ten days aftc:r this last conference with his
client, counsel for plaintiff filed a bill of review charging that
there was error upon the face of the record in that the court had
admitted parol evidence to vary and contradict the terms of the
written contract, and praying that the court annul the decree entered
by the court and enter a decree granting specific performance.
Is Marble entitled to the relief sought by the bill of
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SECTION TWO

QUESTIONS
l.
The Ace Taxi Corr.pany, Inc., employs no drivers but
ly receives orders frr.)m prospecti vc passengers and puts 11 Ace
Taxi Company, Inc." on cabs owned and operated by independent
drivers. One of these drivers, while operating one of the cabs
negligently, collided with another automobile, injuring one of the
cab passengers who reason::.'bly believed the Ace Taxi Company, Inc.,
to be the enL!)loyer. The injured passenger and the owner of the
other automobile each sues Ace Taxi Company, Inc., to recover
damages.

(1)

May the passenger recover?

(2)

May the owner of the other automobile recover?

y~

Oliver Orbit entered into an oral contract with
Inc., a realty company. By the terms of the agreement;
Easybuck, Inc.j was to develop, subdivide and sell Orbit's tract
of land at its own expense; Easybuck, lnc., was given three years
to complete the sale of the land; Easybuck, Inc., was to be reim~
bursed for its expenses out of the first proceeds received from
. the sale of lots; after the expenses had been repaid, Orbit was to
.receive from the sale of the lots $100,000; and all sums received
from the sale of the lots in excess of $100,000, plus expenses, was
to be divided equally between Orbit and Easybu.ck, Inc. Within
,eighteen months from the date of the agreement, Easybuck, Inc.,
had subdivided the land and sold one-half of the lots, which produced sufficient funds to repay Easybuck, Inc.'s expenses and
$100,000 to Orbit. Shortly after receiving payment of $100,000,
Orbit advised Easybuck, Inc., that he was terminating the contract •
.,Easybuck, Inc., thereafter sued Orbit to recover damages for
breach of contract. Orbit filed a plea of the statute of frauds,
setting up (a) that the contract was for the sale of an interest
in real estate, and (b) that the contract was not to be performed
within one year.
2.

How should the Court rule on each ground?

'f
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3.
Landowner and Developer entered into a written conct bearing date March 1, 1961, by the terms of which Landowner
agreed to sell and Developer agreed to purchase a tract of land.
The contract provided that the purchase price would be paid and the
deed delivered on May 1, 1961. The contract contained the following provision:
"If the tract of land described herein cannot be rezoned for
use as a motel, this contract is to be null and void and there
shall be no obligation upon the parties hereunder."
Three days prior to May 1, 1961, Developer advised Landowner that he could not procure the rezoning of the area in which
the property was located before the closing date, and requested
that he be given until May 15, 1961, to enable him to procure a
rezoning of the area. Landowner assented to this request and both
parties signed an endorsement on the written contract in the
following language:
"Developer is given until May 15, 1961, to procure the rezoning of the area in which the property is located. 11
Notwithstanding the endorsement on the contract, Land.>owner, having changed his mind, advised Developer on May 2, 1961,
. that as the purchase price had not been tendered and the deed
delivered by May 1, 1961, the contract was no longer binding upon
him and that he intended to develop the property for his own
'Purposes. On May 14, 1961, the area was rezoned to permit the con' struction of motels and, on May 15, 1961, Developer tendered the
purchase price and demanded a deed for the property. Landowner
refused, whereupon Developer filed suit for specific performance.
Landowner defended upon the ground that the extension of the time
for the performance of the contract was not supported by considera~ion and that he was not thereby bound.
Is this a valid defense?

4.
Pat Jockey, a frequent patron of the race .tracks and
student of the art of deception, conceived the following plan for
cquiring ownership of Bull Run, a valuable race horse,and winning
he Virginia Derby, a race for two year olds, with a $100,000
urse: He would contract to purchase Bull Run fron Cy Trainer,
romising to pay for the horse five days after the running of the
rby; and the day following the race he would sell Bull Run for
ch price as he could get, pocket his winnings, if any, and leave
or parts unknown, without paying the agreed purchase price. Witht disclosing his intentions to Trainer, Jockey procured from
ainer a written contract by the terms of which Trainer sold to
ckey his horse, Bull Run, for the sum of $20,000, $1,000 of which
s then paid in cash, and $19,000 was to be paid five days after
e running of the Virginia Derby. The contract provided that
ediately upon the signing thereof, title to the horse should pass
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of the horse. Two days before the Derby, Trairn:r was told by Jack
Skeeter that since the sale he had had an opportunity to observe
Bull Run in one of his early morning withouts and that his speed
was phenomenal and that the horse should easily win. Skeeter
further told Trainer that he overheard Jockey tell Confidant of
his plan to sell the horse after the race and leave workout paying
the purchase price. Trainer promptly tendered to Jockey the $1,000
he paid and demanded the return of the horse to him. Jockey refused.
Trainer immediately consults you and inquires whether he may recover
possession of the horse.
What would you advise?

5.
Hannibal, a devout and gentle man, died in 1960, at
age of 93, leaving a will containing the following provision:
"All of my property, both real and personal, I devise and
bequeath to such grandchildren of mine as shall take holy
orders, share and share alike. I specifically intend to
exclude my son, Scipio, whose degenerate life has been a
great source of disappointment to.me."
Hannibal was survived by Scipio, his sole heir at law,
d Scipio's two sons, Romulus and Remus. Scipio seeks your
vice as to whether the provision in th.:; will is valid and whether
may claim his father's estate.
How would you advise him?

6.
In 1939, Hershel Weed, a mountain boy from Kentucky,
ved to southwestern Virginia in search of a place to raise his
rge family. Weed found a large expanse of mountain land which
s uncultivated and uninhabited and he immediately fenced off 100
res, cleared the land and built a small home, and at all times
enly claimed that the land belonged to him. The land upon which
ed settled was part of 10,000 acres of mountain land owned by ·
lonel Cathcart Julep, of Richmond. Weed and his family lived
this tract until 1947, at which time his bitter enemy, Borden
bgrass, who had been searching for him for years, found his new
e and forcibly dispossessed Weed and his family and occupied
house and land which Weed had possessed and claimed as his own.
e year later Weed, with the help of his two grown sons who had
turned from the Army, dispossessed Crabgrass and again occupied
e property.
In 1940, Colonel Julep had been adjudged insane and was
fined in a samitarium. He remained there until his death in
5. Colonel Julep died intestate, leaving as his only heir at
his daughter, Amanda Julep, who was seventeen years of age at
time of her father's death. In March of 1961, Amanda consults
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ere tract occupied by him in southwestern Virginia. She has become
ighly concerned over his presence since she has recently ffiarried
nd has made elaborate plans to turn the whole area into a mountain
esort.

How would you advise her?

7.
In May of 1960, Frog, a lumberjack, was gravely
jured when struck by a falling tree. While arrangements were
ing made to carry him to the hospital he gave a trunk key to Toad,
s foreman, and told him to keep it and, in the event that he died,
give it to Tadpole, the infant daughter of his old friend,
llfrog, it being his wish that: all of his worldly possessions, ,
ich were contained. in the trunk, should go to Tadpole if he died.
ter being moved to the hospital Frog took a turn for the worse and
ed within a few hours. When the trunk was opened it was found to
ntain a certificate for a number of shares of Coca-Cola stock,
e present value of which was estimated at more than $100,000, a
ed, dated May 1, 1940, by the teros of which a 100 acre tract of
nd, known as .;Swamp Acre, 11 was conveyed to Frog, and a will,
ted March 10, 1945, which was in the har.dwriting of Frog and
gned by him and contained the signatures of two witnesses, which
~iwill was as follows:
11

Everything I have I give to my nephew,

Watersnake~

/s/ Frog"
Frog owned no property other than that described above.
Who is entitled to his property?

8.
Johnny and Freddie Butterworth, 8 and 6 years of age,
spectively, lived in the City of Richmond. The two brothers took
eat pleasure in riding atop freight cars being shifted in the
ilroad yards along the south bank of the James River. They had
en warned several times by Vigil, the yard watchman, to stay out
the yard and not to ride o~ the cars. On a warm afternoon
ring the month of May, and in spite of Vigil's warnings, Johnny
d Freddie went to the yards after Johnny had returned from school,
d climbed aboard one of the freight cars which was coupled to a
itch engine. Vigil, who the boys thought was off duty, saw them
d as the cars were being moved down the track he angrily yelled
a loud and piercing voice, "Get off that car or I'll throw you
f~
Vigil's loud yell surprised and frightened both the boys
d, as they ran along the top of the car, Freddie tripped over a
anchion which was in p:ain view, fell to the ground and was
riously injured. Shortly thereafter Freddie, proceeding by his
xt friend, brought an action against both the railroad and Vigil
the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond asking damages
11

- 5 of $10,000.
In their grounds of defense, the railroad and Vigil
asserted (a) that Freddie was a trespasser to whom was owed no
duty, and (b) that, in any event, Freddie was guilty of negligence
which barred his right to recover.
Are these good defenses?
\J>
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9.
On the morning or August 6, 1958, Mrs. Shirley
Williams was severely injured in an automobile accident which
occurred in the City of Norfolk. Shortly after the accident she
was taken from the hospital for examination to a laboratory operated
in Norfolk by Dr. Albert Barr for the purpose of undergoing X-rays
to determine the extent of injuries to her head. While the X-rays
were being taken by Dr. Barr, he received an emergency telephone
call which he answered and which caused Mrs. Williams to be subjected to the X-rays for a time far greater than was necessary.
The X-rays indicating no skull fractures, Mrs. Williams was
returned to the hospital from which she was discharged three weeks
later. In December of 1960, Mrs. Williams began suffering from
headaches which became progressively worse; and in January of 1961
she became blind. A subsequent examination showed that her blindness had been caused by a tumor of the brain. On June 14, 1961,
Mrs. Williams brought an action against Dr. Barr in the Court of
Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk alleging that the negligence
of Dr. Barr in X-raying her head for an unreasonable length of time
had brought on her brain tumor and caused her blindness. Dr. Barr
now consults you. He admits that he X-rayed Mrs. Williams an
unnecessary length of time, and that this could have resulted in
her blindness. On further questioning, he concedes that Mrs.
Williams, prior to her loss of sight, had no way of learning she
was suffering from a brain tumor, or learning its cause.
Does Dr. Barr have any defense to the action?

Yi
./

10. Lime Corporation of America accepted the order of
Orville Lund, a merchant in the City of Richmond, to ship him 80
bags of lime at an agreed price, F. o. B., Albany, New York. At
about the same time, Lime Corporation accepted comparable orders
for 600 more bags of lime placed by other buyers in the Richmond
area. Thereafter, and with Lund's knowledge, Lime Corporation
shipped all 680 bags from Albany in one railroad car. Through no
fault of Lime Corporation, half of the bags were spoiled in transit.
Lund was one of the last of the buyers to go to the freight station
to obtain his bags of lime, and by that time those bags which had
arrived in satisfactory condition had been taken by other buyers.
Thereafter, Lund having ignored billings sent him by Lime Corporation, the Corporation brought an action against him in the Law and
Equity Court of the City of Richmond for the agreed purchase price.
Does Lund have a good defense to the action?

